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Introducing the Pula
Until August 1976 Botswana used the currency of
South Africa, the Rand, waiting 10 years after
political independence in 1966 before introducing
its own currency, the Puta. Botswana had the
opportunity of being a party to the Rand Monetary
Agreement, which would have provided cash
compensation for the interest free loan from
Botswana to South Africa, implicit in the use of the
Rand in Botswana. However, it withdrew from the
negotiations, having decided to set up an inde-
pendent central bank and monetary system, with a
separate currency.
The economic reasons for Botswana's decision
were to obtain a greater degree of control over the
country's economy by acquiring some new policy
weapons. To a considerable extent this amounted
to taking a step away from dependence on South
Africa and on decisions taken by the South African
Government.
Before August 1976 Botswana was for most
purposes a monetary province of South Africa.
Money was able to flow freely and legally between
the two countries; Botswana was subject to South
African exchange controls on transactions with all
other countries except South Africa itself, Lesotho
and Swaziland; the external value of Botswana's
currency was decided by the South African
authorities (in South Africa's interests); interest
rates in Botswana were the same as those in South
Africa, with effectively no powers to change this
situation; the cash reserves of the government and
of the private sector were held almost entirely in
Rands (with the exception of some Sterling
balances of the government at the Crown Agents in
London); the commercial banks were not subject to
any control by the Botswana authorities, except to
the very minor extent that the Botswana Govern-
ment had once managed to sell them small amounts
of medium-term stock.
There were some advantages for Botswana in the
old arrangements. Much small and large-scale
investment in Botswana comes from South Africa
and was encouraged by the complete absence of
controls or of an exchange rate risk between the two
countries. In the case of large-scale investment (for
example, by the De Beers Anglo-American Group)
withdrawal from the Rand Monetary Area (RMA)
made little difference since such companies are
used to investing across monetary borders,
although the increase in trouble and risk may result
ultimately in a higher price being paid by Botswana
for such investments. In the case of some smaller-
scale investments, the changeover could be
significant; although probably not for very long
since people quickly get used to a new system.
Tourism was also encouraged by the common
currency, both because of the greater convenience
and because of the exchange control limits on
foreign currency for travel abroad that operate in
South Africa. However, tourism in Botswana is
very small-scale and much less significant than in
Lesotho and Swaziland.
In the absence of a central bank in Botswana, the
commercial banks naturally invested their surplus
liquid funds in Johannesburg. In addition,
other residents in Botswana were free to invest
funds in South Africa, in financial institutions or
with associate companies. At first sight this appears
to have denied use of the funds to Botswana. But in
fact bank lending in the years prior to Puta Day
grew very fast (five-fold in four years). Further-
more, one of the two commercial banks was
allowed to 'overdraw' its account with the associate
company in Johannesburg; and 'bought' additional
funds by offering the government a higher rate of
interest to attract money from the other bank.
Meanwhile, the surplus funds of the other bank
were, by 1976, more than accounted for by
government deposits, so that the main beneficiary
of the relatively high rate of interest being offered in
Johannesburg on liquid funds was the Botswana
Government itself, which also benefited from the
demand for loans in Botswana as the banks
competed for government balances. The outflow of
funds from Botswana, to financial and other
institutions in South Africa, does not seem, there-
fore, to have prevented any lending in Botswana;
meanwhile, the Botswana Government derived
some direct financial benefits.
The absence of local short-term government paper,
usually Treasury Bills, did not deny credit to the
government in the years immediately prior to Pula
Day in 1976, for the same reasons, namely, that
government had large net positive balances with the
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banking system and so had no need to borrow
short-term.
The creation of a central bank, in creating new
policy instruments, also brings new dangers. The
most important is that government is able to
'borrow' from the central bank and so, probably,
impose inflationary pressure on the domestic
economy and create a balance of payments
problem. Without a central bank, government
spending was limited to revenue and loan receipts,
plus any short-term credit the government could
squeeze out of its suppliers. The government could,
of course, have got into financial difficulties by, for
example, borrowing excessively on harsh terms for
non-productive purposes; but the problem of
converting domestic currency into foreign exchange
in order to make foreign payments did not exist -
unless the South African Reserve Bank refused to
make foreign exchange available for a Botswana
Government liability, an unlikely event which
never in fact occurred. The creation of a national
currency and central bank removed the domestic
currency constraint: the Botswana Government
could now create domestic money by borrowing
from the Bank of Botswana, but it could not create
foreign exchange, and it no longer had access to
South Africa's foreign exchange reserves.
The legislation setting up the Bank of Botswana1
tried to prevent excessive government borrowing
from the new central bank, but such legislative
safeguards have always been pushed aside, in Africa
and elsewhere, when governments have been
determined to overspend. Governments can create
more domestic money than is prudent if they are
determined to do so, but this is not a sufficient
reason for remaining a monetary province of
another country. The point is strengthened in
Botswana's case by the divergence of interests,
economic and political, between its government
and that of South Africa. In any case, refusal to
create an independent monetary system is by no
means a sufficient condition for preventing
problems - New York City is a useful illustration
or, perhaps more relevantly, Liberia, which still
uses the US Dollar as its currency.
Quite apart from any other policy instruments ac-
quired when a new and independent monetary
system is created, the ability to borrow from the
central bank can be as useful in some circumstances
as it is damaging in others. Thus if the private
sector is running a surplus with the overseas sector,
as has been the case in Botswana as a result mainly
1 Bank of Botswana Act, 1975; see also the related legislation
setting out regulatory powers over commercial banks: Financial
Institutions Act 1975.
of very profitable diamond mining, this will be
reflected in positive net balances in the banking
system, unused in the form of bank lending - and
possibly unusable for the time being. It is quite
possible to imagine circumstances in which the
government could make use of such surpluses: with
an independent monetary system, and exchange
controls against the holding of foreign bank
balances by the private sector, the government
acquires the use of the funds quite simply, through
their investment in Treasury Bills or their deposit
at the central bank, with no need to alter taxation
or indeed any other action.
The justification for creating the Bank of Botswana
lay, therefore, in the immediate acquisition of new
policy instruments, in their careful use, and in the
hope that new expertise, institutions and markets
would be of long term benefit in the country's
development.2 These are discussed in turn
below.
Exchange Rate Policy
The importance of being able to change the
external value of the domestic currency is well
illustrated by the circumstances surrounding the
revaluation of the Pula in April 1977, some seven
months after it had been first issued.
In March and April 1977, South Africa introduced
a number of measures which were expected to have
adverse effects on the cost of living in Botswana,
especially for the poor. Part of the consumer
subsidy on South African maize was removed
(imported maize is a staple food in Botswana).
Railway tariffs were sharply increased, and South
Africa imposed a 15 per cent surcharge on most
imports, including many essential goods.
Botswana was severely constrained in its possible
responses. An increase in the minimum wage
would have helped only those in employment
within the country. But only 60,000 or so4 are
recorded as employed, and not all of these would be
reached by an increase in the minimum wage. Nor
would such a move reach the poorest families who
are found more in informal employment and in
rural areas.
2 See the Government white Paper setting Out Its reasons for
withdrawal from the RMA, A Monetary System for Botswana',
Government Paper no 1,1975.
The creation of the new monetary system was described in the
Bank of Botswana Annual Reports for 1976 (pp 2-20) and 1977
(pp 1-5).
62,700 in 1977, including formal sector self-employed (working
proprietors and family workers), Statistical Bulletin, December
1978.
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A second possibility was to subsidise the consumer
price of maize. Administratively this would have
been difficult because of the scattered population
and the decentralised import and distribution
system. It would have been exceedingly difficult to
administer a subsidy to small stores obtaining
maize supplies from over the border in remote
areas, or to farmers doing the same in order to
supply their workforce. Even more important, the
government could not afford to subsidise the
Western Transvaal's maize consumption: this was
believed to be a real risk for the same reasons of
geographic remoteness and lack of administrative
capacity to control the country's border trade.
Revaluation on the other hand, was simplicity
itself. It required merely an administrative decision
at the centre and the ironing out of some subse-
quent complications, mainly concerning the
deferred pay of Batswana working in South Africa.
Revaluation5 could not, given the structure of the
Botswana economy and external trade, make much
difference to the income of the country as a whole.
It could, however, re-distribute income in an
almost wholly benign way. Botswana is not only
heavily dependent on imports; poor people depend
more heavily on imports than rich people. The
poor spend a higher proportion of their income on
essentials, which are mainly imported, than the
rich, who spend more on services which are pro-
duced locally such as housing, electricity and car
repairs. The poorest spend about 70 per cent of
their cash incomes on imports, the richest only
about 40 per cent. Many of the poorest families
derive a significant proportion of cash income from
the remittances of family members working in
South Africa. However, survey results showed that
the poorest households only received about
one-third of their cash income from abroad in this
way, so that while revaluation would reduce the
Pula equivalent of one-third of income, it would
reduce the Pula cost of some two-thirds of spending
- provided that imports passing through the distri-
bution sector were in fact sold at a lower price than
would otherwise have been the case.
About 60 per cent of imports into Botswana are for
the use of the importer - who thus benefited from
the revaluation directly. But there was some doubt
about the other 40 per cent, as it was feared that
traders would allow a revaluation to increase their
profit margins rather than pass it on to consumers.
Subsequent investigation showed that these fears
were unjustified: retailing, at least of basic neces-
These paragraphs are based on the Bank of Botswana Annual
Report 1977, pp 13-16.
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sities, seems to have been sufficiently competitive
for revaluation benefits to have reached the
consumer. Price rises on a 'basket' of foods,
accounting for 50 per cent of the low income
consumer price index, were about five to seven
percentage points less in Botswana than the average
price rise on the Witwatersrand and Kimberley'
[Bank of Botswana Annual Report 1977: 16].
If consumers gained, who lost? Somewhat
surprisingly, the government turned out not to be a
loser. Government revenue does indeed depend
quite heavily on the taxation of exports and
exporters' profits, which in turn are reduced in Pula
value by a revaluation; but government is also a
major importer, and the savings on imports turned
out to match the loss of revenue closely enough for
the effect of revaluation to be ignored.
Revaluation turned out, therefore, to be a way of
re-distributing income from exporters to con-
sumers. Exporters consist of:
- the diamond mining company (31 per cent of
commodity exports);
- cattle owners (30 percent);
- the copper-nickel mining company (26 per cent);
- others (13 per cent).
The diamond mine's profits - apart from the large
proportion paid to government as royalty, tax and
dividend - are paid abroad; the diamond market
was at the time exceptionally strong, and potential
new mines were profitable enough to be considered
for exploitation after a revaluation.
Cattle products are exported by the Botswana Meat
Commission (BMC), which is de facto a buyer's
cooperative. Although the BMC is government
owned, it is obliged by statute to pass on changes in
sales prices to producers, and has only very limited
scope for building up or running down its own
financial reserves. The effective losers from a
revaluation are therefore cattle owners. Cattle
ownership is extremely unequally distributed in
Botswana, so that the main impact of revaluation
fell on large-scale owners of cattle. The political
impact on the cattle owners, who enjoy a well-
organised lobby was, however, lessened by BMCs
ability to maintain producer prices after the
revaluation, as a result of strong beef prices abroad.
The copper-nickel mining company is foreign-
owned and was, in 1977, running at a large loss
consisting almost entirely of interest payments on
its debt. Losses were made up by inflows of capital
from the foreign shareholders, who have also
guaranteed the government's large foreign debt
which had been undertaken to build the public
infrastructure needed for the mine and township.
Revaluation increased the mine's losses but,
provided it did not close the mine, the immediate
net effect was small because the losses were
matched by increased capital inflow. The mine did
not close.
The revaluation, at five per cent, was small, and its
impact was therefore also small. But, as far as it
went, it achieved its objective in reducing the rate of
inflation below what it would otherwise have been,
and may have had a further beneficial effect in
reducing later wage and salary awards which are
much influenced by the rate of inflation. It could
not have taken place before l976 and no other
policy weapon was available to achieve the same
results.
Interest Rates8
The creation of a new monetary system meant that
some new interest rates had to be decided upon:
bank rate (the rate at which the Bank of Botswana
lends to the commercial banks), Treasury Bill rate,
and deposit rates for commercial bank and
government deposits at the Bank of Botswana being
the main, ones. At first the new rates were designed
to fit roughly into the existing structure. Since then,
rates have twice been lowered, opening up a small
gap between rates in Botswana and rates in South
Africa. The structure has been altered slightly,
mainly to encourage depositors to place money on
longer term at commercial banks.
Formally the exchange control regulations do not
allow residents of Botswana to hold liquid assets
abroad,9 so that interest rates should only be
relevant to decisions as to where to borrow - for
those borrowers who have a choice. With adequate
and rising foreign reserves, and excess bank
liquidity within the country, Botswana would have
been happy to see some switching of borrowing to
domestic banks: hence the gap in the relative cost of
borrowing in Botswana and South Africa (which
supplies 85 per cent of imports and presumably
substantial trade credit). At the same time the high
ratio of trade to GNP and to the foreign exchange
reserves has caused the Botswana authorities to
move cautiously, since the country could not afford
large-scale switching.
ist December 1976 was the first possible date, as the Rand/Pula
rate was guaranteed at I : 1 until 30th November.
For a general discussion of the role of interest rates in Botswana
and of the reduction in rates of August 1978, see Statistical
Bulletin, September 1978. See also successive Bank of Botswana
Annual Reports.
With minor exceptions, related to convenience not interest
rates.
So far, the differential in favour of borrowing in
Botswana (not more than one-and-a-half percent-
age points between prime borrowing rates) has had
no effect - even though the commercial banks have
had so much excess liquidity as to refuse at times to
accept further large deposits at advertised interest
rates.
The other reason for lowering interest rates was to
take advantage of a falling rate of inflation to bring
nominal rates down. Although in theory a high
nominal borrowing rate may be zero or negative in
real terms, a borrower is certain about having to
pay the nominal rate, but highly uncertain about
whether inflation will affect his own sales prices in
line with other prices, or even whether inflation
will continue. The Botswana authorities have had
the opportunity, therefore, to react more quickly
than South Africa in bringing down nominal rates.
Bank Lending and Money Supply
The Bank of Botswana has conventional powers to
influence bank lending and the money supply
directly, by means of primary reserve and liquidity
ratios, and by forbidding the two commercial banks
to hold significant foreign currency balances. As a
result the full operations of the two banks come
under Bank of Botswana jurisdiction.
In fact, economic and monetary conditions since
1976 have led the Bank of Botswana to use
unconventional means to manage the money
supply - and have illustrated the relative impotence
of central banks in encouraging expansion, com-
pared with their very considerable powers of
restraint if expansion is occurring too fast.
By 1976 the Botswana economy was between
mining booms. Bank lending, having expanded
from P14 mn in 1972 to P73 mn in the first quarter
of 1976, remained at or about that level until the
time of writing (mid-1979). Such expansion as
continued was generated by the government and the
diamond mining company, neither of which needed
domestic credit. On the contrary: they both had
increasing net positive deposits with the banking
system. The credit needs of the copper-nickel mine
were supplied from abroad. Many other factors
played a part, but the net result was static bank
lending and steadily rising bank deposits.
The Bank of Botswana reacted at first by removing
government balances from the commercial banks to
the Bank of Botswana, and later by opening an
account for 'one large company' [Bank of Botswana
Annual Report 1978: 25], both of which had the
effect of reducing the excess liquidity of the com-
mercial banks. The aim was not to prevent
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increases in bank lending. Indeed the Bank of
Botswana made it clear, by lowering interest rates
and by offering to move official balances back to
the commercial banks if they were needed, that
increased lending would receive every official
encouragement. The reason for taking money out
of the commercial banks was to prevent further
refusal of deposits: 'the authorities in Botswana are
unwilling for businesses in Botswana to be unable
to place their spare cash at the banks at reasonably
attractive rates of interest', no doubt because
otherwise depositors would have an incentive to try
and evade exchange control regulations by placing
deposits abroad.
The Bank of Botswana also tried to encourage
longer-term lending by the commercial banks.
Institutional credit is dominated by the two
commercial banks; at the end of 1978 bank lending
was P75 mn compared with only P4 mn by the
National Development Bank and the same amount
by the Botswana Building Society. The two smaller
institutions have only four offices between them,
whereas the banks are represented in all major and
some minor centres. Thus, although the growth of
the locally-owned financial institutions is an
important long-term objective, any significant
increase in longer-term lending must come from the
commercial banks.
The Bank of Botswana had from the outset
increased the incentive to lend, by widening the gap
between the rate of interest on lending and the rate
of interest on marginal liquid assets. This gap,
representing the marginal earnings on additional
lending, had increased by three percentage points
by the end of 1978; the banks were forced to place
marginal liquid funds at the Bank of Botswana at a
low rate of interest compared with those obtainable
in Johannesburg.
In addition, the authorities tried to encourage
longer-term lending by placing some government
money (and offering to place more) on three year
deposit with a commercial bank and by altering the
rules so that no low-yielding liquid assets needed to
be held against such a deposit.
However, the Bank of Botswana commented in its
1978 Report that 'the rather stagnant economic
conditions of 1978 curtailed lending of this type'. It
remains to be seen whether the banks will increase
their longer-term lending when the economy starts
growing rapidly again, or whether foreign-managed
British-style banks are simply unwilling or unable
to fill this particular gap.
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Financial Expertise
One of the benefits of creating a central bank is that
a certain amount of financial expertise is con-
centrated in one institution. This is not simply a
matter of hiring a few people with the right know-
ledge and experience, for in performing their
normal duties, central bank employees acquire new
expertise, which could in principle have been
acquired anyway, but in practice is usually not.
For example, the Bank of Botswana had to invest
the country's foreign reserves in foreign currencies.
In so doing, it developed some knowledge of foreign
currency markets and exchange rate risks. The
Bank was also obliged by statute to advise govern-
ment and parastatals on their borrowing. The
concentration of these two functions in one institu-
tion created a new awareness of the currency risks
of external borrowing. In addition, policy on
domestic borrowing by parastatals from central
government gradually became more coherent as the
Bank was asked for advice on a succession of
proposals. That advice was formulated by officials
with the particular points of view acquired in a
central bank.
More generally, financial policj as a whole should
improve, or even be formulated for the first time, as
the result of the creation of a new monetary system
and central bank. The opportunity may not of
course be taken, and is not absolutely dependent on
new institutions. But in Botswana, at least, some-
thing of the sort did occur, not only in the central
bank, but as a side effect in other institutions such
as the Ministry of Finance and the planning units of
other ministries.
The changes described do not amount to a remedy
for the many forms of economic dependence from
which Botswana suffers. As the President summed
up in his speech at the official opening of the Bank
of Botswana:
no amount of monetary wizardry, no central
bank, however well run, can prevent people being
worse off if their cattle get foot-and-mouth
disease, if we suffer drought or if we suffer from
any of the many other crises that could occur in a
small land-locked country such as ours. But by
the careful building up of foreign exchange
reserves, by keeping a watch over the country's
financial institutions, and by being willing to lend
to the banks or the government at the right
moment, a central bank can make it easier for the
government and people to cope with crises and to
go ahead with their affairs in normal times with
greater confidence.
[Bank of Botswana Annual Report 1978: 1]
